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REVISITING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DILEMMA:
HOW DID WE GET TO A STRONG WTO IPR REGIME?
Julien Chaisse† & Xinjie Luan‡
The increasingly robust protection of Intellectual Property Rights
(“IPRs”) worldwide stems from the ever-increasing importance of IPintensive industries in international environments. However, IPR
protection and enforcement are bound both by national and
international IPR-related laws, policies, and practices. Since the
development of the United States’ IPR system, there has been a
dramatic transformation of IPR-protection modalities, from a soft one
based on “monopoly phobia” to a strong one in the absolute sense. The
United States has made it its aim to strong-arm the negotiations of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”) provisions to obtain strong IPR protection. As for many
other World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Members, attending the
multilateral IPR negotiations and then accepting the negotiating
results have seemingly become a strategic choice to circumvent the
United States’ unilateral actions against IPR violations. Considering
the onerousness of the Doha Round Agenda, it will be significant if
future TRIPS reforms will avoid the dilemma caused by focusing
obsessively on strong IPR protection and enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual properties (“IPs”) or intellectual property rights
(“IPRs”) have considerable economic and legal importance in
international trade. IP-intensive imports and exports, IP royalties and
license fees, IP-related content downloads, and cross-board deliveries
demonstrate the significance of IPRs.1 In retrospect, there are two
major policy types of IPR protection and enforcement—i.e., the strong
one and the weak one. What should be mentioned is that, to some
extent, the so-called “weak” protection of IPRs concerns sometimes
“could not” but not “would not”. In other words, weak IP protection is
a systemic imperfection of IP protection and enforcement in certain
members of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)—e.g., the Least
Developed Countries (“LDCs”) sourcing from their lower levels of
economic and social development, rather than an intentional policy
alternative.2
Without contradiction, legal culture should be an integral part of
the whole ethical culture. In the patent context under the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”),
1. Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/307/Rev.1,
at 88 (Mar. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Trade Policy Review].
2. Intellectual Property: Balancing Incentives with Competitive Access, in 12 GLOBAL
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 129 (World Bank 2002).
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established in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) (namely,
the forerunner of the WTO),3 we can read between the lines that patent
protection is one of the outstanding objectives under the TRIPS. Part
III, which is entitled “Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,”
sets forth the general obligations for IPR enforcement. Article 41
thereof reads:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as
specified in this Part are available under their law so as to
permit effective action against any act of infringement of
intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement,
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further
infringements.4
Apparently, the “protection” is the core of the cultural ethics of
the current international intellectual property system. Of these general
obligations that the WTO members must assume, the first and foremost
concern is to protect IPRs, whereas boosting transfer of the patent
technology and follow-up innovation is not specifically mentioned in
Part III of TRIPS.5 Moreover, “economics is simply too blunt a tool”6
to discipline the most appropriate scope and boundary of IPR
protection, and the blockage being solely based on a financial stake is
no better than balancing the pros and cons of all situations as far as IPR
benefits are concerned. Innovation and development are no doubt the
contemporary common focus of WTO members, but it must be stressed
that intellectual monopoly with excessive IP protection would also
retard innovation and development.7 Determining the most suitable
levels of IPR protection is a complex and comprehensive issue, rather
than a single and simple economic one.8 In fact, through the discussion
3. Catherine Field, Negotiating for the United States, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT – PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 130 (2015),
http://bit.do/field-negotiating-for-US. On the ongoing WTO negotiations, see generally Julien
Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s Supremacy in the International Trade
Order – A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 9 (2013).
4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 41, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, 318 (1994) (emphasis added) [hereinafter TRIPS].
5. TRIPS, supra note 4, arts. 41-61.
6. Alfred Yen, Restoring Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST.
L. REV. 517, 539 (1990).
7. Richard A. Spinello, A Case for Intellectual Property Rights, 13 J. ETHICS INFO. TECH.
277, 281 (2011) (reviewing MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY (2010)).
8. For an interesting discussion of the complexity in finding “legislative balance,” see
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in Section II.A about the developing history of the United States’ IP
regime, both strong and weak IPR protection regimes can be used in
combination as a primary governmental guideline and exist in
reciprocal dependence.
In this Article, Section I discusses how the United States has
gradually corrected the mode of strong IPR protection and led global
engagement on hard IPR protection issues, including through its own
trade policy tools and multilateral structure—e.g., the negotiation on
TRIPS and the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“DSM”) under the
Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (“DSU”). Section II addresses whether a singular choice of a
strong or weak IPR protection mode involves a dilemma. The answer
thereto would be “No!” had no external pressure been exerted by, for
example, the United States. Lastly, Section III concludes with a
summary account and discloses that IPR protection is complex and
cannot be settled in a single, simple fashion. Certainly, it is
instrumental to review international IPR systems in a less arbitrary
manner to achieve a significant breakthrough concerning future TRIPS
reform, in view of a cautionary tale of repeatedly extended deadlines
for acceptance of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement.
I. STRONG IPR PROTECTION: WHO BUT THE UNITED STATES CAN
LEAD IT?
It is well known that IPR protection and enforcement have long
been considered a central part of the United States’ IP-intensive
economy and of its imports and exports markets.9 The action mode of
strong IP protection and enforcement in the United States had been
applied, on the one hand, through its trade policy tools, especially the
Special 301; and, on the other hand, through internationally multilateral
regimes, including the DSM of the WTO.10

Bryan Druzin, Restraining the Hand of Law: A Conceptual Framework to Shrink the Size of Law,
117 W. VA. L. REV. 59 (2014) (positing a model to help policymakers find the correct balance
between regulatory over-invasiveness and insufficient regulation).
9. Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 1, at 36.
10. U.S. INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT (June 2013), http://bit.do/IPEC-2013 .
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A. Strong IP Protection Through Trade Policy Tools
In fact, treating the IPR protection as the keynote of IP regimes,
and therefore fostering IP protection, has existed since the United
States’ founding in 1776.11 The U.S. Constitution was written in 1787,
ratified in 1788, and has formally operated since 1789.12 Section 8 of
Article I of the U.S. Constitution sets forth in part that “[t]he Congress
shall have power . . . to promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”13 Simply stated, this
clause stipulates copyright and patent of authors and inventors shall be
protected by the U.S. laws. Pursuant to which, the first patent and
copyright acts of the United States were in force as of 1790.14 It is worth
noting that, in 1777, the slogan “To Counterfeit is DEATH” was
printed on the Pennsylvania three pence bill, which may represent the
world’s shortest anti-counterfeiting declaration.15 In fact, currency
counterfeiting is considered a special kind of piracy.
When viewed as a whole, the gradual fade of weak IP protection
stemming from “monopoly phobia”16 in the United States took place
by the end of the 1970s. The phenomenon was contributed to numerous
research- and development-intensive technological breakthroughs or
IP-based innovations. The IP system had become an integral part of the
United States’ innovation policy framework by that time.
After the 1970s, strengthening the protection of IPR has gradually
occupied a dominant position in IP-related bilateral and multilateral
negotiations, and furthermore, there arose a kind of power or influence
culture based on the so-called law of the jungle.17 Enactment of the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), as of September 9, 2011,
promoted the most significant regulatory and administrative reforms of
the last sixty years of U.S. patent protection and enforcement.18 The
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) asserted in an apparent,
11. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
12. The Day The Constitution Was Ratified, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (June 21, 2017),
http://bit.do/thedayconstitutionratified (last visited Nov. 22, 2017).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
14. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109; Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124.
15. John Dunlap, Three Pence Bill (photograph), http://bit.do/threepence (last visited Nov.
22, 2017).
16.
See Beverly W. Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REV.
967 (1952).
17. The Oxford Living Dictionary defines Law of the Jungle as “the principle that those
who are strong and apply ruthless self-interest will be most successful”. See Law of the
Jungle, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARY, http://bit.do/law-of-the-jungle (last visited Sept. 30, 2017).
18. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).

158

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 34

aggressive manner that AIA implementation also provided “a renewed
opportunity to harmonize the international patent system.”19
Aiming to lead the world in IP protection and policy, the United
States’ IPR acts have been continuously developed, and moreover,
there is one great characteristic in these developments—namely, that
the scope and content of the United States’ IPR protection have been
extended into new fields.
It is well known that traditional IP includes patents, trademarks,
copyrights, and trade secrets. But now geographical indications, new
plant varieties, layout designs of integrated circuits, software
copyrights, data pools, trade dress, logos, and so on are all
encompassed by IP protection. In the meantime, creative industries—
comprising programme, music, electric publishing, audio-visual,
gaming software, and other large amounts of application and
entertainment software, and thereby international digital trade
delivered via the model of transnational digital downloads over the
Internet—have been developed rapidly in recent years. The value of
royalties and licensing fees which the United States has obtained
therefrom increased from $98 billion in 2009 to $130 billion in 2013.20
Moreover, the United States maintained a huge IP-related trade surplus
in 2012 and 2013, $84 billion and $88 billion, respectively.21 The
United States now has a dominant position in these industries and
trades, and yet it clearly and incisively criticizes internet piracy as
being “the single most important barrier to digital trade.”22 The United
States considers it to be a serious problem and imposes on itself the
central task of strengthening the protection of electrical IPR in
accordance with the ever-increasing importance of these new economic
and trade patterns.
In the meantime, issues like anti-dilution, anti-counterfeiting, and
geographical indications outreaching rights are developed to be
independent legislations or to become new topics of international
multilateral IPR negotiations organized by the IPR Committee of the
WTO. Thus, the persistent, broad terms of reference of the United
States’ IP system makes the system per se more complex than ever
before. In the modern, competitive, and sophisticated economy, a
stable and organically-organized IPR system will undoubtedly help
consumers reduce search costs and discover the specific products
19. Global Impacts of the AIA, USPTO, http://bit.do/uspto-global-impacts (last visited
Sept. 27, 2017).
20. Trade Policy Review, supra note 1.
21. Id. at 89.
22. Id. at 90.
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which meet their personal preferences or demands. In this respect, it is
well recognized that an IP with prestige in the marketplace must be
protected against any misuse by others, which would otherwise
undermine its distinction and further increase the likelihood of
confusion.
Consequently, the anti-dilution significance relating to the famous
IPR protection has increased over time. The Federal Dilution Act,
which came into effect in 1996, and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (“ACTA”)23—signed in October 2011 by eight members
including Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand,
Singapore, South Korea, and the United States—are two examples
developing from a special concern about a specific law or agreement.
The ACTA “reportedly does not require any statutory changes to U.S.
law”.24 This further shows that the relatively mature IPR system of the
United States plays a leading and exemplary role in the development
of international IPR rules, even though the outlook of ACTA is
uncertain and has not yet been in force to date.
The strong protection of IPRs, say, putting special emphasis on
the inventor’s or the owner’s interest protection from anticounterfeiting and piracy, has been taken into prior account under the
U.S. IPR system. Also, in this circumstance, the IPR system in the
developed country members of the WTO has increasingly been treated
as a powerful instrument for encouraging innovation and invention.
For instance, in response to growing demands for license content,
Spain set up its own patent system for pharmaceuticals in 1992.25 In
contrast, pharmaceuticals were not incorporated into the Canadian
patent system until 1993.26 For the sake of strengthening the United
States’ IPR protection as from the 1970s, the wording “IP protection”
or “protect IPRs” has gradually lodged itself into the public
consciousness at the international level.
It is also well known that legal culture is an indispensable and
integrative part of American culture, and a complicated system of laws
23. ACTA is an international plurilateral agreement combating the infringement of
intellectual property rights, counterfeiting, and piracy. It includes provisions on the IPR
enforcement, especially on civil, criminal, border, and digital environment enforcement measures.
See European Commission Press Release IP/10/1504, Joint Statement on the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement (ACTA) from All the Negotiating Partners of the Agreement (Nov. 15, 2010).
24. Trade Policy Review, supra note 1, at 36.
25. See Julien Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign
Investment – How Will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect the Emerging Global Regime?, 15
J. INT’L ECON. L. 51 (2012). See also Harvey E. Bale, Patent Protection For Pharmaceuticals: A
Platform For Investment, Markets And Improved Health In The Americas,
http://bit.do/patentprotectionforpharma (last visited Nov. 22, 2017).
26. Bale, supra note 25.
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affects everyday life in the United States.27 Based on the sheer
economic and trading scales, along with the size of U.S. domestic
market, the American legal culture carries weight on a global scale
(either as deterrence or influence). The well-established IPR regimes
of the United States form a forceful basis for its own policy output of
strengthening IPR protection. With the start of the Uruguay Round
negotiations, it was a highly suitable time for considering the IP
protection problem on a multilateral scale.
B. Strong IP Protection Through Multilateral Regimes
Invention, innovation, creativity, and branding—which are
reflected by means of international registration and the transfer or
authorizations for use of specific IPs—represent a large amount of
economic value. This is supported by the fact that international
royalties and licensing fees for IP-trade reached approximately $300
billion in 2014.28 In view of both the IP economic value and all the
participants’ varied requests in the course of negotiations on the TRIPS
draft, the TRIPS final draft unavoidably covers provisions and
disciplines linked to conflicting factors—such as grounds for issuing a
compulsory license, improved IPR protection and enforcement,
safeguards against unilateral sanctions for infringement of IPRs,
market access of IP-based goods, promoting transfer of technology
with patent licensing, etc.29 The international community has also been
keenly focused on these issues and, in particular, on IPR protection and
compulsory licensing.
Different WTO members targeted three concerns in the TRIPS’
preamble:
i) reducing “distortions and impediments to international
trade”;30
ii) promoting “effective and adequate protection of
intellectual property rights”;31 and
iii) ensuring that “measures and procedures to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become
barriers to legitimate trade.”32

27. Many of the U.S. government’s own laws affect and restrict its own actions.
28. TRIPS Agreement: Changing The Face Of IP Trade And Policy-Making, at 8 (2015),
http://bit.do/changing-face-IP-trade.
29. DANIEL J. GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 2425 (2d ed. 2003).
30. TRIPS, supra note 4, at pmbl.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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The latter two, which meant strengthening the protection and
preventing the abuse of IPRs, have developed simultaneously with the
accepted opinion about “compromises with regard to achieving various
objectives.”33 However, there is no indication of which concern is of
primary importance. Even the first target alludes to compromise, but
keeps silent about it. In other words, the mutually contradictory
measures both for protecting and preventing the abuse of IPR help to
reduce distortions and impediments to international trade. Therefore,
two seemingly simple de lege but complex de facto issues arise. Firstly,
which of the targets between protecting and preventing the abuse of
IPR should be paramount since all original participants in the TRIPS
negotiations need to benefit from something in the IP package?
Secondly, how should a pragmatic balance of these two tenets for
protecting or preventing the abuse of IPR be maintained to promote
international trade?
As stated above, the United States’ IPR protection and
enforcement regimes are among the world’s most systematic and
effective, and therefore special international attention has been paid to
the United States’ strong protection of IPRs. At present, it is no
exaggeration to say that the United States is in the vanguard of
international protection and enforcement of IPRs. With its
technological leadership, the United States’ IP-intensive industries
have, since the 1980s, been the backbone of its national economy, and
therefore its IP-intensive industries would be subject to material injury
unless strong multilateral mechanisms for IP protection and
enforcement are established.
Although compromise, concession, and flexibility are, to a limited
extent, relevant in the context of the different international negotiations
and consultations, strengthening the protection of IPRs was both the
starting point and the ultimate aim during the United States’
participation in the TRIPS negotiations.34 In the TRIPS negotiations,
an essential requirement of the United States was that access to the U.S.
market depended on whether the exporting country had provided
effective and adequate protection of IPRs.35 Naturally, this requirement
was based on the United States’ own domestic IP-related acts. Here,
we take the Special 301 under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 (“the Special 301”) as an example.
The Special 301 Report identifies those countries that “deny
adequate and effective protection for intellectual property rights or
33.
34.
35.

Field, supra note 3.
Id.
Id. at 133-34.
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deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. persons who rely on
intellectual property protection.”36 Specifically, it focuses on
monitoring trademarks, including geographical indications (“GI”),
counterfeiting and copyright piracy; digital, internet, and broadcast
piracy; government use of software; and trademark and domain name
disputes.37 The first Special 301 Report concerning the weakness of
some trading partners in IP protection was issued on May 25, 1989.38
More seriously, the guideline of strong IPR protection and enforcement
on bilateral and multilateral bases have thereafter been made perfectly
clear, the reasons thereof being declared as follows:
As a result of this extensive review, the [United States Trade
Representative (“USTR”)] concluded that no foreign country
currently meets every standard for adequate and effective
intellectual property protection as set forth in the U.S.
proposal on intellectual property tabled in the Uruguay
Round.
Thus the USTR has determined that all countries are eligible
for potential priority designation based on the standards of the
U.S. Uruguay Round proposal, because all countries “deny
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights” within the meaning of the statute.39
The United States has fired the shot heard all around the world via
the Special 301. In 2013 and 2014, a total of 177 trading partners of the
United States were reviewed and 76 thereof were placed on the Priority
Watch List and the Watch List, according to the USTR’s 25th annual
Special 301 Report.40 Also, there were 37 and 34 countries identified
on the Priority Watch List and the Watch List in 2015 and 2016,
respectively.41 It could be argued that, with the aggressive stance taken
by the United States in applying the Special 301 and the Special 301
Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets,42 no country can escape
36. 2016 Special 301 Review: Identification of Countries Under Section 182 of the Trade
Act of 1974: Request for Public Comment and Announcement of Public Hearing, 81 Fed. Reg.
1,277 (Jan. 11, 2016).
37. Id.
38. Press Release, United States Trade Representative, USTR Fact Sheet: “Special 301”
On Intellectual Property (May 25, 1989), http://bit.do/USTRfactsheet (last visited Nov. 22, 2017).
39. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
40. Trade Policy Review, supra note 1, at 99.
41. These trading partners in the Priority Watch List in 2016 Special 301 Report include
Algeria, Argentina, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine and
Venezuela. See generally 2016 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE SPECIAL 301 REP. 3 (Apr. 2016);
Kevin E. Noonan, U.S. Trade Representative Issues 2017 Special 301 Report, PATENT DOCS
(May 4, 2017), http://bit.do/Patent-Docs-2017special301rep.
42. Trade Policy Review, supra note 1, at 99.
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the USTR’s discovery of IPR infringement, even though some aspects,
for instance trading retaliation mechanism contained in the Special
301, may be inconsistent with WTO obligations, as analyzed in Section
III.B, below.43
With the Special 301 being such an effective instrument targeted
at closing the links between the U.S. domestic market access for goods
and effective IPR regimes in exporting countries, the United States
stalwartly pursued its goals and requirements for IP protection and
enforcement, evaluated its partners’ IP protection regimes, and
established whether a country’s acts, policies, or practices provided
adequate and effective IP protection and enforcement.44 One fact has
been clear—namely, that speeding up the multilateral negotiations of
enforcement disciplines on protection of IPRs would be of critical
importance for restraining the United States from taking unilateral
action against its opponents’ IP violations. To be brief, TRIPS “is
aimed at preventing unilateral actions.”45 As a matter of fact, with the
application of these unilateral actions against, for instance, Singapore,
the Republic of Korea, Brazil, and China,46 all of which were lately
involved in the TRIPS negotiations, the United States effectively
improved its negotiating position, and it has become widely recognized
that access to the U.S. market for IP-intensive goods will be denied if
any country lacks restrictive IPR protection and enforcement under its
domestic legal regime.
Of the IPR protection in some developing countries, it may be said
that these countries are forced by circumstance to take some part in the
TRIPS negotiations, and they had to incorporate strong IP
protection into their own IPR laws, policies, and practices. Brazil, for
instance, encountered the U.S. unilateral trade sanctions on October 20,
1988, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1973, after President
Reagan appealed for the launch of a new round of IP-covered
multilateral trade negotiations in 1986.47 With the allegation of an IPR
infringement, the United States attempted to, on the one hand, coerce
Brazil to strengthen its IPR protection legislation and, on the other,

43. See also Suzanne Zhou, Challenging the Use of the U.S. Special 301 Procedures
Against Developing Country Access to Medicines Policies – Indian Pharmaceutical Patents and
the WTO 9 (Sept. 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://bit.do/ZhouChallengingtheuse.
44. Field, supra note 3, at 133.
45. Carlos M. Correa, The TRIPS Agreement: How Much Room for Maneuver?, 2 J. HUM.
DEV. 79, 80 (2001).
46. Field, supra note 3, at 132.
47. Id.
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improve its own negotiating position, above all that related to TRIPS.48
This seeming coincidence fully proved the United States’ intention and
objective of strengthening the IPR protection by means of entering into
a multilateral IPR agreement (later which came to be TRIPS). The
Hobbes doctrine49 of defense by applying the pressure of absolute
sovereignty in U.S. foreign policy was again fully manifested.
The current TRIPS agreement covers the major contents provided
in a proposal by the United States in October 1988 on requirements for
IPR protection and enforcement.50 This proposal, together with those
subsequently set forth by the European Community (“E.C.”) (the
predecessor of the European Union (“E.U.”)), Japan, Switzerland, and
Australia, constitutes the core substantial and structural framework.51
What is more, one fact should not be neglected in that, seeing a lack of
a global footprint for its time, the United States has been playing a
leading role in the “Quad” (comprising the United States, Canada, the
E.C., and Japan) and “the Friends of Intellectual Property Group”
(including the “Quad”, Switzerland, and so on) in the history of TRIPS
negotiations, after all these countries held similar views and intended
to develop a shared set of strict multilateral regimes on IPR protection
and enforcement.52 There have been many examples which prove this.
For instance, the E.C. concretely proposed the use of trade sanctions
for IP-related breaches at the meeting of December 11, 12, and 14,
1989. These proposals read in part that:
[i]t was therefore necessary to provide for the possibility of
meaningful sanctions in cases where other measures had
proved insufficient to solve a dispute. The Community
proposal therefore suggested that, in conformity with Article
XXIII of the General Agreement, such sanctions could
include the possible suspension by a contracting party of the
48. Id. at 132-33.
49. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) is now regarded worldwide as “one of a handful of truly
great political philosophers”, who advocated with the social contract method that “we ought to
submit to the authority of an absolute—undivided and unlimited—sovereign power.” For more
details, see Sharon A. Lloyd & Susanne Sreedhar, Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy,
STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Feb. 25, 2014), http://bit.do/Lloyd-Hobbes.
50. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Note By the Secretariat: Suggestion By the United States For
Achieving the Negotiating Objective – Revision, WTO Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14/Rev.1 (Oct.
17, 1988).
51. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcement of
Intellectual Property Rights: Joint Communication from the European Communities, Japan,
Switzerland, and the United States, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/485, at ¶ 4 (Nov. 2, 2006).
52. Peter Drahos, Global Law Reform and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Intellectual Property,
in 3 COPYRIGHT LAW: COPYRIGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 43, 54 (Benedict Atkinson & Brian
Fitzgerald eds., Routledge 2016).
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application of any concession or other obligation under the
GATT, as determined to be appropriate by the Contracting
Parties.53
IP compulsory licenses are another example. Such conditions for
enforcing compulsory licences as “public non-commercial use,”
“national emergency,” and “circumstances of extreme urgency” were
proposed by, inter alia, the United States, the E.C., Japan, and
Switzerland.54 In addition, improving the transparency in deciding
whether to grant a compulsory license or not was pursued and was a
shared objective of these developed countries.55 Limitations on the use,
scope, duration, and so forth were well established as chief disciplines
for the implementation of compulsory licenses. This further
identified that IPR “protection” is distinctly a core concept that runs
through the whole of the TRIPS negotiations.
Inevitably, there are certain exceptions. For example, an
important patent protection principle of first-to-file did not enter the
TRIPS agreement only because of the requirement of making a basic
change of the ongoing principle of first-to-use in the U.S. patent
regime.56 Exceptions from patentable subject are another example. The
E.C., Switzerland, and Japan are three developed members proposing
common exceptions from patentable subject matter, and the current
TRIPS agreement also explicitly lays down these exceptions in Article
27 (entitled “Patentable Subject Matter”), under Section 5 (entitled
“Patent”).57 However, the United States was not included in the group
raising the proposal for the common exceptions. Furthermore, because
these exceptions had received overwhelming support, the United States
placed great emphasis on preventing the abuse of these exceptions
through crafting the negotiated TRIPS text, and this was fully contrary
to the E.C.’s, Switzerland’s, and Japan’s support for the exceptions.58
In any case, when it comes to the IPR issue, the United States’ top
priority is to strengthen IPR protection.59

53. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Note By the Secretariat: Meeting of Negotiating Group 11, 12, and
14 December 1989, WTO Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/17 (Jan. 23, 1990).
54. Field, supra note 3, at 143.
55. Id.
56. Thomas F. Zuber, Registering and Enforcing a Foreign Trademark in the U.S., IP
INT’L: CHINA IP, Mar./Apr. 2009, at 101.
57. TRIPS, supra note 4.
58. Field, supra note 3, at 141.
59. Richard A. Morford, Intellectual Property Protection: A United States Priority, 19 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 336 (1989).
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At this point, we can answer the question raised at the outset of
this Section: under TRIPS, which is more important between the
following—IPR protection or preventing the IPR abuse through
compulsory licensing? We respond that the former is more important
than the latter. Article 1 of TRIPS, entitled “Nature and Scope of
Obligations” provides a more positive answer, which reads in part:
Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their
law more extensive protection than is required by this
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene
the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system
and practice.60
As a rule, the word “shall,” as opposed to “may,” legally identifies
a compulsory obligation.61 The special alternatives of “may” or “shall”
in Article 15 (entitled “Protectable Subject Matter”) and in Article 16
(entitled “Rights Conferred”) of TRIPS have further demonstrated the
nature of strong protection under the TRIPS mechanism. In other
words, obtaining trademark status is not limited to the precondition of
registration in accordance with the “may” provisions. Reading between
the lines, we find that “protection” of the trademark is no doubt the sole
tenet per se, whether using the word “shall” or “may”.
Article 15 reads in part that:
Where signs are not inherently capable of distinguishing the
relevant goods or services, Members may make registrability
depend on distinctiveness acquired through use.
...
Members may make registrability depend on use. However,
actual use of a trademark shall not be a condition for filing an
application for registration. An application shall not be
refused solely on the ground that intended use has not taken
place before the expiry of a period of three years from the date
of application.62
And, Article 16 reads in part that:
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive
right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s
60. TRIPS, supra note 4, at art. 1(1).
61. One example of such alternation can be found in Article 1 of TRIPS: “1. Members shall
give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obliged to,
implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided
that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement. (…)”. Id.
62. TRIPS, supra note 4, at art. 15 (emphases added).
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consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar
signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to
those in respect of which the trademark is registered where
such use would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of
the use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a
likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.63
It goes without saying that now the IPRs have been much more
closely linked de jure with “protection” than with “compulsory
license.” This result stemmed from the special preference of the United
States and other like-minded countries with a determined IP-protection
ideal. Originally, antitrust and competition law is the natural enemy of
the monopoly of knowledge or the abuse of IPR, but from the United
States’ perspective, the lack of transparency, predictability, and wellaccepted standards for applying IPR leaves the U.S. IPR holder
“vulnerable.”64
This kind of increasingly popular “protectionist” view even has a
fundamental impact on the ruling of the WTO dispute settlement body
(“DSB”). In India – Patents (U.S.), the Appellate Body actually
referred to the above-mentioned three objectives in the TRIPS
preamble in its interpretation of Article 70.8(a) of TRIPS, as follows:
The Panel’s interpretation here is consistent also with the
object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. The Agreement
takes into account, inter alia, “the need to promote effective
and adequate protection of intellectual property rights.”65
“Inter alia” is defined as “among other things” or “especially”.66
One question remains: why did the Appellate Body circumvent the
third target, i.e., the prohibition of the abuse of IPRs or the IP
compulsory licensing?
Expressed concisely, the “strong protection” of IPRs has
developed along the line of stringent IPR protection and enforcement
under the United States’ and other like-minded countries’ guidance.
There is no doubt that the implementation of the TRIPS agreement
implies that the United States successfully pursued its IP protectionist
objective on a multilateral basis. Logically, the TRIPS agreement has
helped the United States to “align with international norms” with its
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.67
63. TRIPS, supra note 4, at art. 16 (emphases added).
64. Id.; Field, supra note 3, at 154.
65. Appellate Body, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R, at ¶ 57 (Dec. 19, 1997) (emphasis original).
66. Inter alia, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).
67. Trade Policy Review, supra note 1, at 94.
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II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN STRONG AND SOFT IPR PROTECTION
MODES
As far as the conflicts between the strong protection of IPR and
the weak one are concerned, we will examine the relationship between
the IPR protection and enforcement and the multilateral DSM under
the GATT 1994. More specifically, the conflicts in the field of IPrelated retaliation and cross-retaliation under the DSM reflect such an
international reality that the strong protection and enforcement of IPRs
is not the only policy choice.
A. Conflicts in the Field of IP-Related Retaliation under the
WTO/DSM
Concerning the issue of IP-related retaliation, there is a very
controversial story among the United States, India, and New Zealand.
1. The United States
As mentioned above, the United States strongly favor the link
between the U.S. domestic market access for IP-intensive products and
the IP-protection conditions in exporting countries.68 Therefore, the
United States strongly adheres to the TRIPS provisions under the DSU,
including, inter alia, the rules and procedures relating to the suspension
of concession or other obligations, e.g., retaliation.
2. India
India has stressed that IP disputes can only be negotiated for
settlement rather than for implementing trade retaliation. India even
tended to take the same route as that mentioned in the polemical book
Against Intellectual Monopoly,69 in which Boldrin and Levine
pungently criticized contemporary patent and copyright regimes as “an
unnecessary evil” and called for systematic reform.70 Without
intending to advance the IPR dispute settlement matters more
generally, India inclined to defend exclusive IPR and to encourage free
riding, and thereby encourage the contraction of R&D investments, or,
say, have “virtually no research conducted by its pharmaceutical
industry after a 1970 law.” India also has weak patent protection,71 even
if there is a well-known opinion that new, follow-up products always
68. See Section I, supra.
69. MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2008).
70. Spinello, supra note 7, at 279.
71. Id. at 281.
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mean significant improvements in quality and immense economic
benefits.72
3. New Zealand
Comparatively, at the time, New Zealand just focused on “floating
some ideas that could bridge the differences”73 and proposed that all
the IP-related trade retaliations involving non-compliance with DSB
recommendations and rulings should solely be endorsed by the TRIPS
Committee, a special deliberating body for IP dispute settlement
architecture going beyond the current WTO’s DSM.74 Getting to the
bottom of the proposal raised by New Zealand, one may find that it
reflected the very protectionist nature for IPRs, namely, “an ex ante
incentive for maximizing expression and innovation,”75 or the proper
incentives for creating and inventing76 within the limitation of IPRs
itself as well as its derivative rights and within an ascertained period.
Different from the mode of strong IPR protection implemented in
the United States, the soft one like New Zealand’s never overlooked
the factors that warrant IPR protection based not only on the public
interest in a broad sense but also on maintaining the creative and
reputational interests of the IPR holders.77 The latter interests are also
the core pragmatic rewards of the creator’s labor. Actually, in such a
global IP-intensive competitive environment, free riding is not
sustainable whether de lege or de facto. Those WTO Members who
place emphasis on the soft IP protection (like India) face a common
issue—namely, that their IP strategy should be “upgraded” in the future
because the moral foundation of strong IPR protection has been
pursued by the United States, the E.U., and others who have numerous
IP-intensive industries, such that “[e]veryone has the right to the

72. For discussion of India’s approach to pharmaceutical patents, see Samira Guennif &
Julien Chaisse, Present Stakes Around Patent Political Economy: Legal and Economic Lessons
from the Pharmaceutical Patent Rights in India, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y
65 (2007); David K. Tomar, A Look into the WTO Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute Between the
United States and India, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 579 (1999).
73. Adrian Macey, Dispute Settlement in TRIPS: A Two-Edged Sword, in THE MAKING OF
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT – PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS
351, 354 (2015).
74. Macey, supra note 73, at 355.
75. Spinello, supra, note 7, at 279.
76. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031 (2005).
77. Ministry of Business, Innovation, & Employment, Copyright and the Creative Sector,
New Zealand Government – Study of the Role of Copyright and Registered Designs in the Creative
Sector in New Zealand 4 (Dec. 2016), http://bit.do/CopyrightCreativeSector.
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protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”78
B. Conflicts in the Field of the IP-related Cross-Retaliation
under the DSM
Cross-retaliation under the DSM is a much more threatening
weapon. In contrast, cross-retaliation under the DSU is limited to
three sectors—namely, goods, services, and IPs, in accordance with
Article 22(3) of DSU.79 Trading retaliation measures based on these
three sectors are mutually equivalent and reciprocal. For instance, once
cross-retaliation is authorized by the DSB against the U.S. trading
restrictions on certain imports, the compulsory licensing of some U.S.
patents could also be legally chosen as one of the effective means of
retaliation. In other words, the retaliation instrument of IPR limitations
could be applied against market access limitations, e.g., an antidumping, countervailing, or safeguarding measure. In fact, there is a
precedent for this although it is subject to the lack of specific,
procedural, and substantial rules—which aim to evaluate the
equivalence between the market access forbidding measure and IPRs
utilized as retaliation tool—and how to withdraw the IP license benefits
because of the opponent’s failure to implement market access
obligations under the GATT 1994 and the subsequent DSB arbitration
award of non-compliance. Retaliation by way of “goods for IPRs”
(“goods–IPRs”) could be deemed to be irrational or even somewhat
ludicrous, because most of the WTO members have been accustomed
to the “IPRs for goods” (“IPRs-goods”) tit-for-tat mode—not the
opposite “goods for IPRs” approach under the United States’
continuous crusade to strengthen IPR protection since the 1970s. More
importantly, almost all of the developing country members do not have
sufficient, effective, and ingenious IPR resources to carry out goods–
IPRs retaliation.80

78. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at 27 (Dec. 10, 1948).
79. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. See Julien Chaisse & Debashis Chakraborty, Implementing WTO
Rules Through Negotiations and Sanctions: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and
Dispute Settlement System, 28 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 153 (2007); see also Julien Chaisse &
Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s Supremacy in the International Trade Order: A
Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J. INT’L ECON.
L. 9 (2013).
80. Danish, WTO Dispute Resolution and Cross Retaliation Under TRIPS: Is it Sanctioned
Piracy of Intellectual Property?, 3 WESTMINSTER L. REV. (Oct. 2013), http://bit.do/DanishWTODispute.
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It is noteworthy that there are seven categories of IPRs under the
current TRIPS. They cover patent, copyright, trademark, geographical
indication, industrial design, layout design of integrated circuits, and
unclosed information.81 Therefore, the numerous IP sources will
unavoidably complicate the issue of choosing the most suitable IPR
retaliation. Assessment of the corresponding amount and duration of IP
retaliation as well as identification of the level of the nullification or
impairment caused by the original IP infringement are no easy tasks.82
Further, the retaliation sectors under Article 23(3)(g) of the TRIPS
agreement are applied to goods-, services-, and trade-related IPRs.
However, even the IPRs–IPRs retaliation itself cannot feasibly be
operated within the same TRIPS agreement.83
III. STRONG IPR PROTECTION: A TOUGH NUT TO CRACK
Many problems stem from limitations, and the simple ex parte
limitation is infeasible. This observation may help to explain the fact
that the strong protection of IPRs, as discussed above, has not always
been a popular, widely-held position in the whole development process
of the U.S. IPR regime. Certain IP-related acts, regulations, or
practices—such as the Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”),
which by its very nature involves strong protection—are also the
disputed ones. According to the CTEA, individual copyright holders
are granted an extra 20 years and thus a total of 70 years after their
death for the protection for their works.84 This extension does not
certainly stimulate creativity by promoting social justice. It safeguards
the legal needs of future creators; it has therefore been criticized
because “it has contributed to the copyright thicket that complicates an
author’s efforts to use old copyrighted sources in a way that goes
beyond the parameters of fair use.”85
Moreover, although the U.S. government had made
a robust defense of IPRs within its borders, it is obvious that the U.S.
policy of strengthening IPR protection measures is a tough nut to crack.
The issue of “patent trolls” is a clear example of how strong IPR
protection has seriously retarded innovation and creativity. What patent
trolls do is purchase the patent rights, especially to license them or to
initiate patent infringement claims plainly based on a monetization
81.
82.
83.
84.
(1998).
85.

See TRIPS, supra note 4, at arts. 9-39.
Macey, supra note 73, at 358.
DSU, supra note 79.
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
Spinello, supra note 7, at 277.
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scheme, without the intent to innovate and create, much less improve
social welfare considerations.86 In this respect, the monopoly sourcing
from the exorbitant IPR protection is a “cancer” that needs to be
abolished without delay.87 Lao Tzu (circa 571–471 B.C.) said: “[i]f we
cease to set store by products that are [tough] to get, there will be no
more thieves. If the people never see such things as excite desire, their
hearts will remain placid and undisturbed.”88 It seems therefore that the
soft protection of IPR is also a reasonable alternative.89
The soft IPR protection herein, which places more emphasis on
the protection of the consumers’ or the public’s interests, may be called
the balanced development approach of the international IPR system,90
which is in full compliance with the provisions in the TRIPS
agreement. For instance, Section 8 of TRIPS, entitled “Control of AntiCompetitive Practices in Contractual Licences,” takes note of the fact
or the possibility that IP licensing practices or conditions restrain
competition and thereby produce adverse effects on trade and impede
the transfer and dissemination of technology. Article 40(2) of TRIPS
further stipulates that:
[a]s provided above, a Member may adopt, consistently with
the other provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures
to prevent or control such practices, which may include for
example exclusive grant back conditions, conditions
preventing challenges to validity and coercive package
licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of

86. Ian Appel, Joan Farre-Mensa, & Elena Simintzi, Patent Trolls and Small-Business
Employment, HARV. BUS. SCH.: WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 28, 2017), http://bit.do/AppelPatentTrolls.
87. Spinello, supra note 7, at 278.
88. LAO TZU, TAO TE CHING (Arthur Waley trans., Foreign Language Teaching & Res.
Press, 1998).
89. Indeed, under certain circumstances a “soft” regulatory approach may exert substantial
force. For a fascinating exploration of “soft” regulation with specific reference to international
soft law instruments, see Bryan H. Druzin, Why Does Soft Law Have Any Power Anyway?, 7
ASIAN J. INT’L L. 361 (2017) (arguing that network effects can infuse soft law with significant
adoption and compliance pull). See also Bryan Druzin, Using Social Norms as a Substitute for
Law, 78 ALB. L. REV. 67 (2016) (examining the possibility of policymakers strategically using
prevailing norms to reinforce or replace legislation); Bryan Druzin, Planting Seeds of Order: How
the State Can Create, Shape, and Use Customary Law, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 373 (2014) (arguing
that policymakers can harness the energy of customary ordering to trigger legal order); Bryan H.
Druzin, Towards a Theory of Spontaneous Legal Standardization, 8 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT
403 (2016) (positing a theory of bottom-up, decentralized legal ordering).
90. Anne Ardagh, Intellectual Property Protection and the WTO TRIPS Agreement:
Finding a Global Balance as Part of the Doha Round, in ENGAGEMENT & CHANGE: EXPLORING
MANAGEMENT, ECONOMIC AND FINANCE IMPLICATIONS OF A GLOBALIZING ENVIRONMENT 139
(2007).
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the Member.91
As a de facto multilateral guideline on the establishment,
implementation, and development of international IP regimes, this
provision also specially considers the elimination of the IP barriers of
different countries. The “Zhong’yong Zhi Dao”92 (i.e., “a middle
course”) approach in IPR protection is extremely necessary. The
viewpoint herein is firmly supported by an argument that “although
stronger IPR protection directly increases the incentive to innovate, it
also discourages innovation in the long run by suppressing the process
of ‘learning by doing.’ . . . This implies that both very strong and very
weak IPR policies decrease innovation, so a moderate approach is
preferable.”93
Furthermore, more challenges arise in overturning the decisions
that reflect the WTO members’ broad interests. As is widely known,
the WTO commonly makes its decisions by consensus.94 TRIPS has
placed the developing country members in something of a dilemma.
Cross-retaliation with potential threat of IPRs–goods mode under the
TRIPS is one thing and the United States’ possible bilateral sanction
but for the TRIPS agreement is another.95 Thus, under this proposed
“middle course” approach, we can speculate that the TRIPS agreement
reached back then would face hurdles at attaining concensus. After all,
the developing country members have given greater consideration and
effect than ever before to the issues of IPR protection and
enforcement.96
So far, the acts, policies, and incentives that foster IPR access will
become an integral part of the innovation regimes. IPR protection and
enforcement might then be crafted so as to reduce barriers while
maximizing the positive effects of IPR protection and while
minimizing its potentially negative effects. However, strengthening the
IPR protection and enforcement has been regarded as a top-level
objective of the United States throughout the TRIPS negotiations and
especially since the TRIPS agreement came into force. This
91. TRIPS, supra note 4, at art. 40(2).
92. YU-LAN FUNG, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 172-74 (Derk Bodde ed.,
The Free Press 1997) (1948).
93. Yuichi Furukawa, Intellectual Property Protection and Innovation: an Inverted-U
Relationship, 109 ECONS. LETTERS 99 (2010).
94. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. 9, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 159-60.
95. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L.
REV. 1823 (2002).
96. SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR & IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34292,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2014).
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observation is further confirmed by the United States’ overall strategic
goals, including the U.S. Department of Commerce strategic goals for
2014–201897 and the strategic plan of the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office.98 The former focuses on accelerating the growth of innovationintensive economic sectors and promoting enhanced IP protection
abroad while the latter sets out three goals: “optimize patent quality and
timeliness, optimize trademark quality and timeliness, and provide
domestic and global leadership to improve IP policy protection and
enforcement.”99
In the future, the United States might eventually bring about its
own dilemma when emerging economies, such as China, Brazil, and
India—which all frequently appear on the Priority Watch List or the
Watch List of annual U.S. Special 301 Reports—become powerful,
innovating countries, and these countries mirror their IPR regimes with
the United States’.
CONCLUSION
The implementation of a strong IP protection mode or a soft one
is simply a policy choice. The strong IP protection mode reflects, in a
specific manner, national strategies focusing on developing global
competition and meeting central demands of creativity and innovation
in certain special economic and social developmental phases in the
United States. In contrast, juxtapose that mode with the Office of
USTR official website headline of “America First Trade Policy”:
The Office of the United States Trade Representative is
committed to ensuring that American workers are given a fair
shot at competing across the globe. USTR is working to
reshape the landscape of trade policy to work for all
Americans. On a level playing field, Americans can compete
fairly and win. This new America First trade policy will make
it more desirable for companies to stay here, create jobs here,
pay taxes here, and rebuild our economy. Our workers and the
communities that support them will thrive again, as
companies compete to set up manufacturing in the U.S., to
hire our young people and give them hope and a real shot at
prosperity again.100
97. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., AMERICA IS OPEN FOR BUSINESS: STRATEGIC PLAN | FISCAL
YEARS 2014 – 2018, VERSION 1.1 (2014), http://bit.do/AmericaOpenBusinessF14-18.
98. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMM., 2014 – 2018 STRATEGIC
PLAN, http://bit.do/USPTOStrategicPlanF14-18 (last visited Nov. 22, 2017).
99. Trade Policy Review, supra note 1, at 93.
100. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, http://bit.do/USTR-AmericaFirst (last
visited Jan. 24, 2017).
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In the field of IPR protection, the corresponding position was
declared in an USTR press release dated December 12, 2016, which
reads:
Trademarks, copyright, patents, and trade secrets play a
crucial role in America’s global competitiveness. IP-intensive
industries directly account for 27.9 million high-paying jobs
and indirectly support 17.6 million more. As the Joint
Strategic Plan makes clear, the U.S. will continue to pursue
high global standards in protection and enforcement of
intellectual property rights.101
It is apparent that strong IPR protection and enforcement have
become Hobson’s choice and must be promoted. In particular, the
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 has been in
force since February 24, 2016, and it lists IPR as one of “[t]he priority
trade issue” and directs that the Office of the USTR shall now include
one presidentially-appointed “Chief Innovation and Intellectual
Property Negotiator,” who:
shall . . . conduct trade negotiations and . . . enforce trade
agreements with respect to United States intellectual property
and . . . take appropriate actions to address acts, policies, and
practices of foreign governments that have a significant
adverse impact on the value of United States innovation.102
In view that this law is designed for promoting a new “America First
trade policy” and helps to “compete fairly and win”103 for the U.S. IPintensive industries, it will be undoubtedly carried out by the Trump
Administration. The strong IPR protection in the United States will
open a new chapter.
However, tracing back to the founding of the United States, one
can find yet another case. Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the
Declaration of Independence, said in 1813 that:
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the
globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and
improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly
and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them,
like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their
density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe,
move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement
101. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Trade Representative
Welcomes Strategic Plan to Enhance Intellectual Property Protections (2016),
http://bit.do/USTRpressrelease (emphasis added).
102. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, § 609, Pub. L. No. 114–125,
130 Stat. 125, 190 (2016) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(6)).
103. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 100.
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or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature,
be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right
to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men
to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or
may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the
society, without claim or complaint from anybody.104
Attention should be paid to the use of “may” but not “shall” in the
last sentence. With the emergence and development of the American
innovation economy, great changes in principle have taken place in its
IPR laws, policies, and practices.
In a metaphorical sense, thought is the head of the times. Indeed,
where there is a will, there is a way. TRIPS is by any means a very
mixed bag filled with an enormous amount of multilateral provisions
for strong IPR protection and enforcement stemming from the United
States. The deterrent for offenders of IPR compulsory licensing is far
less than that of the U.S.’s four swords105—the Generalized System of
Preference (GSP), Section 301, Special 301, and 337 Investigations—
while the spirit linking market access with the conditions of IPR
protection and enforcement embodied by the four protecting
instruments has been fully incorporated into the TRIPS agreement.
Therefore, IPR protection continues to be the strongest point under the
current international IPR system.
The formation of the strong protectionist characteristics of the
ongoing international IPR regime is rooted in, on the one hand,
international pressure from the United States, the E.U., and on the
other, developed WTO members, which now have made
a robust defense of strengthening IPR protection and enforcement. On
the other hand, the internal incentive to pursue technical innovation is
supported by invention patents and creative expression in some WTO
members. Of course, protecting intellectual property is also a morallydriven notion during the socioeconomic development of different
WTO members. Exclusive rights accorded to the owners of IPR are
important instruments for guaranteeing the returns on their creative
activities. The U.S. preferential objective of IP protection and
enforcement reflects the desire for tough disciplinary measures to
address IP infringement but, in no case, to encourage the flexibility in
setting out the level of protection or compulsory licensing for IPRs.

104. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON: 11 MARCH TO 27 NOVEMBER 1813 379 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., Princeton Univ.
Press 2009), available at http://bit.do/Jefferson-McPhersonLetter (emphasis added).
105. See The Year in Trade 2011: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 63rd Report,
USITC Pub. 4336 (July 2012).
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What should be mentioned is that Canada is a member of both the
“Quad” advocating strong IPR protection and “the Friends of
Intellectual Property Group” in the process of TRIPS negotiation, as
mentioned above in Section II.B. This indicates that Canada has been
playing the same central role as the United States in facilitating the IPR
multilateral protection. Unfortunately, the Office of the USTR always
designates Canada as a Priority Foreign Country (“PFC”), and has
continuously placed Canada on the Priority Watch List (2009–2012) or
the Watch List (2002–2008, 2013–2016) in the Special 301 Report
since 2002.106 This is an astonishing fact, considering that the Special
301 Report is “the result of an extensive multi-stakeholder process”107
“following extensive research and analysis”108 and only a country
having “the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices and
whose acts, policies, or practices have the greatest adverse impact
(actual or potential) on the relevant U.S. products”109 can be named as
a PFC and qualified as a trading partner taking a position on the Priority
Watch List or the Watch List. It therefore seems that the U.S.’s strong
IPR protection system is harsh enough. As far as most less-advanced
country members of the WTO are concerned, their own IPR protection
and enforcement regime still has a long way to go to be in consonance
with the U.S. requirement of providing “high levels of protection.”
Bob Dylan, an American singer-songwriter who was awarded the
2016 Nobel Prize in Literature,110 wrote a thought-provoking song
entitled “Blowing in the Wind.” The first two lines of its lyrics read as
follows: “How many roads must a man walk down before you call him
a man? How many seas must a white dove sail before she sleeps in the
sand?”
If these two questions were asked in the IPR-related context, the
answer would be: when the leading country has been finally successful
in catching up with its destined target in view of current global
unbalanced innovation infrastructure and economic development.
Anyway, it is rational to conclude that “a country’s IPR regime likely
coevolves with its economy” and that “countries try to alter their IPR
regime in response to changing needs.”111 Whether the IPR regime is
106. See generally 2002-2013 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE SPECIAL 301 REPS. (20022013).
107. 2016 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE SPECIAL 301 REP. 1 (Apr. 2016).
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id. at 1.
110. Laura Smith-Spark, Bob Dylan wins 2016 Nobel Prize for Literature, CNN (October
13, 2016), http://bit.do/CNN-Bob-Dylan.
111. Hiroyuki Odagiri et al., Introduction to INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 12 (Hiroyuki
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perfect or not does not depend on the purpose and objective expressed
with such ambiguous wordings as “adequate and effective,” “fair and
equitable,” or “having adverse effects on trade or competition,” but on
its acceptable degree in practice. Seeing the laborious progress of the
Doha Round Agenda over a long period of time,112 it will be of
exemplary significance if the current TRIPS reforms will escape the
dilemma which focuses on strong IPR protection and enforcement.

Odagiri et al. eds., 2010).
112. Frank Altemöller, A Future for Multilateralism? New Regionalism, CounterMultilateralism and Perspectives for the World Trade System after the Bali Ministerial
Conference, 10 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 42 (2015).

